"Power Play: Balancing Efficiency and Protection in Fixed vs. Variable Electricity Pricing."
  J. Bonan, C. Cattaneo, G. D’Adda, and 1 more author 
   Ongoing 
  Presented: SEEDS Conference 2025, EAERE 30th Annual Conference, AWEEP Workshop 2025, MWEET Workshop 2025. 
     
  Fixed-term retail energy contracts shield end users from market fluctuations but can introduce market distortions by implicitly subsidizing consumption when prices rise. Using high-frequency consumption and billing data from a major Italian energy utility, we study consumer behavior following the default transition from fixed-price to indexed-price contracts, which occurred when initial fixed prices were substantially below wholesale levels. We find that electricity demand is relatively inelastic, with an average price elasticity of -0.12, but responsiveness increases over time. Households continue to reduce consumption more than eighteen months after the default, indicating a persistent lag in their adjustment to the price signal. The default also induces financial distress, increasing missed payments and installment bill plans. We show that fixed-price contracts have distributional implications, appearing regressive in absolute terms, but progressive relative to income. Efficiency losses from consumption distortions are more pronounced at the lower and upper ends of the income distribution.